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A Process Model of Posthypnotic Amnesia 
L. ROWELLHUESMANN,C.L,AWRENCEGRUDER, ANDGARYDORST 
The existing empirical evidence on the locus of the “posthypnotic amnesia” 
effect within the human information processing system is reviewed. Two new 
experiments are introduced to clarify the locus and the mechanism producing the 
effect. On the basis of the review and these experiments, an information-pro- 
cessing model is constructed that emphasizes the inhibition of verbal output as 
the central process. According to this model, hypnotically susceptible subjects 
fail to report “forbidden” material because it has been tagged as “forbidden” in 
response to the hypnotic suggestion for forgetting. This material is retrieved by 
these subjects and can play an active role in information processing, but it cannot 
be reported. The implications of this theory for related hypnotic effects on 
memory are discussed. mi 19X7 Academic Pm\\. Inc. 
Although hypnotism was one of the earliest tools employed by psy- 
chologists, and a large body of research on hypnosis has accumulated, no 
clear consensus has emerged about the processes through which hyp- 
nosis affects information processing and human memory. A number of 
factors have contributed to this state of affairs. Until recently, hypnosis 
has remained outside the mainstream of experimental psychology despite 
the attentions of prominent experimentalists (e.g., Hilgard, 1965, 1977; 
Hull, 1933). The methodologies employed by many researchers have 
been seriously flawed and their results lend themselves to multiple inter- 
pretations. This situation has been changing, however, and a number of 
well-designed experiments has emerged recently concerned with the ef- 
fects of hypnosis on memory and information processing. The focus of 
most of this recent research has been the use of hypnosis to degrade 
memory (hypnotic amnesia), though some has also been concerned with 
the use of hypnosis to enhance a person’s memory (hypnotic hyperm- 
nesia) and the use of hypnosis to induce a person to relive earlier cxperi- 
ences (hypnotic age regression). While hypermnesia and age regression 
may have captured more public attention because of their potential appli- 
cations in the legal and clinical areas, posthypnotic amnesia seems to be a 
more robust and replicable phenomenon. In this article we attempt to 
integrate the recent research on posthypnotic amnesia with two new ex- 
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periments to develop an information-processing model consistent with 
most existing data. 
Posthypnotic Amnesia 
While initial interest in posthypnotic amnesia was stimulated by the 
observation that hypnotized subjects do not recall very well what 
happens during hypnosis (Hilgard, 1977), experiments have shown that 
such an amnesia must be suggested for it to occur at a level greater than 
in a nonhypnosis control group (Evans & Thorn, 1966; Hilgard & 
Cooper, 1965). In the most common paradigm, subjects are told during 
hypnosis that they will not be able to remember specific material after 
they “awaken.” Most often the phenomenon is demonstrated as follows. 
Subjects are selected who are highly hypnotically susceptible by admin- 
istering a pretest (e.g., the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Suscepti- 
bility, Shor & Orne, 1962) to a large number of subjects in a group set- 
ting. An hour-long tape recording is played, including suggestions for a 
number of behaviors such as relaxation, arm levitation, sleep, posthyp- 
notic behavior, and posthypnotic amnesia for what they heard and did 
during the session. 
In some studies the subjects’ memory for what occurred during the 
session serves as the dependent variable and is related to other subject 
characteristics. In other studies those who respond most readily to the 
suggestions during this session are selected to become an experimental 
group. During the subsequent experiment they listen to another taped 
hypnotic induction procedure lasting about 30 min. The setting is usually 
a dim and quiet room. After hypnosis has been induced, the to-be-re- 
membered material is presented and they memorize it to a specified crite- 
rion. Then the amnesia suggestion is made: subjects are told they will not 
be able to remember the material when they awake from hypnosis until 
they hear a releaser signal (e.g., three hand claps). After being awakened, 
subjects are asked to recall the to-be-remembered items. Typically, they 
report at that time a much smaller proportion of the to-be-remembered 
items than they report later after the releaser signal is given (Barber & 
Calverley, 1962; Cooper, 1972; Kihlstrom & Shor, 1978; Nate, Orne, & 
Hammer, 1974; Williamsen, Johnson, & Eriksen, 1965). Furthermore, 
they perform distinguishably differently from two types of control sub- 
jects commonly used (Sheehan, 1973)-high susceptibles who were not 
hypnotized and low susceptibles who were told to behave as they thought 
hypnotized subjects would behave (simulators). 
To many cognitive psychologists (Roediger, 1978), several aspects of 
this methodology may appear unsatisfactory. First, subjects are often not 
assigned randomly to the experimental and control groups, but rather on 
the basis of their susceptibility to suggestions. Thus, it is difficult to know 
what portion of the effect is due to the experimental treatment and what 
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portion to the subjects’ susceptibility. Susceptibility, in fact, has been 
shown to be directly related to degree of forgetting within hypnotized 
groups (Hilgard, 1965; Kihlstrom & Evans, 1976). Second, order of recall 
and time of recall are often confounded with recall conditions (prere- 
lease-postrelease); within this design. Finally, the subjects’ failure to re- 
port a to-be-remembered item is open to interpretations other than what 
most memory psychologists would call amnesia. 
Nevertheless, posthypnotic amnesia, as it has been defined in the liter- 
ature, is a robust and easily replicable phenomenon. Not only do subjects 
report they cannot recall the to-be-remembered material, they appear to 
believe they cannot recall it (Evans, Kihlstrom, & Orne, 1973). What 
they do report appears disorganized (Evans & Kihlstrom, 1973; Kihl- 
Strom & Evans, 1979; Spanos & Bodorik, 1977; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, 
& Stam, 1980), and their deficit in reported recognition seems to be less 
than their deficit in reported recall (Kihlstrom & Shot-, 1978). The deficit 
in reported recall remains even if the subjects are given cues to the mate- 
rial during the hypnotic session (McConkey & Sheehan, 1981; 
McConkey, Sheehan, & Cross, 1980). 
The current theoretical explanations for posthypnotic amnesia fall into 
four main groups: dissociation, disrupted memory search, distracted at- 
tention during recall, and inhibition of output. Since the amnesia sugges- 
tion occurs after learning, and the presentation of a releaser cue reverses 
the amnesia almost entirely (Kihlstrom & Evans, 1977), posthypnotic 
amnesia cannot be due to changes in the encoding, organization, or 
storage of the to-be-remembered material. Neither can it be due to any 
permanent structural change or ablation of the material. The material is 
clearly available but may not be accessible (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). 
Dissociation 
The strong form of dissociation is generally credited to Janet (1901). 
This theory proposes that there is a complete functional split in the infor- 
mation-processing system so that one portion of the system is unaware 
and unaffected by processing and memories in the other portion. Re- 
cently a neodissociationist view has emerged that is more closely con- 
nected with current models of cognition (Hilgard, 1976a, 1976b, 1977; Kihl- 
Strom, Evans, Orne, & Orne, 1980; Kihlstrom, 1978b, 1981). According 
to this view, dissociation is a fractionation of the mind that requires ef- 
fort. This fractionation allows one part of the mind to function relatively 
independent of other parts or to be controlled separately by external 
stimuli (e.g., the hypnotist) without other parts being aware or affected. 
However, the exact processes through which this might happen have not 
been well specified. Hilgard (1977) suggested, for example, that hypnotic 
amnesia might be produced by having the subroutines for retrieval opera- 
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tions separated from executive’ control and assigned to the control of the 
hypnotist. But the data from experiments argue against such a complete 
separation, since some material is usually retrieved despite the amnesia 
suggestion. Kihlstrom and Shor (1978, p. 346) describe posthypnotic for- 
getting as due to a “dissociation of particular memories from conscious 
control.” But again it is not well specified what such dissociation means 
in information-processing terms. 
Perhaps the most telling criticism of the dissociation models stems 
from experiments showing that the to-be-remembered items, which sub- 
jects report not being able to recall, still remain active in the cognitive 
system. In fact, no deficit has been found in the memory for to-be-re- 
membered items on any dependent measure except verbal report. Fifty 
years ago, Hull (1933) and his colleagues showed that relearning of a skill 
that hypnotic subjects were told to forget occurred more rapidly than if 
the skill had never been learned. More recently, Graham and Patton 
(1968) and Coe, Basden, Basden, and Graham (1976) have reported that 
retroactive interference in list learning is not reduced at all by telling a 
hypnotized subject to forget the interpolated list. Similarly, the priming 
effect of one presentation of a word on its subsequent generation in a 
word association task is not reduced by hypnotic amnesia for the word 
(Kihlstrom, 1980). Finally, conditioned GSR responses to posthypnoti- 
tally unrecognizable words remain significantly different from responses 
to neutral words (Bitterman & Marcuse, 1945). Thus, while verbal report 
measured through either recall or recognition is reduced by a hypnotic 
suggestion for amnesia, more subtle measures of retrieval from memory 
show no deficit. 
These results require one to reconsider the unavailability (Tulving & 
Pearlstone, 1966) of posthypnotically “forgotten” information. Recently, 
a consensus has emerged among cognitive researchers that there are two 
types of processes capable of accessing memory structures-controlled 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), effortful (Hasher & Zaks, 1979) processes 
of which the subject is aware (Posner & Snyder, 1975) and automatic 
processes performed without awareness. The data reported above sug- 
gest that posthypnotic deficits in memory are only detectable from the 
output of controlled, effortful retrieval processes of which the subject is 
aware. It is arguable whether one should call such a phenomenon dissoci- 
ation. 
The dissociation model also has had difficulty in explaining the effects 
of hypnosis on automatic processes in divided attention experiments 
(Messerschmidt, 1927; White & Shevach, 1942). In fact, when hypnotic 
suggestions are used to keep a secondary task out of awareness, perfor- 
mance on the primary task is often impaired compared to a waking di- 
vided attention condition (Knox, Crutchfield, & Hilgard, 1975; Ste- 
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venson, 1976). These results are consistent with the concept that the sub- 
ject must devote effort to complying with hypnotic suggestions. How- 
ever, these performance data reveal neither evidence of dissociation as a 
result of hypnosis nor evidence that, as dissociation theories would pre- 
dict, divided attention performance improves with hypnotic susceptibility 
(Bowers & Brennenman, 1981). 
It is very difficult to reconcile such results with either the classical or 
the neodissociationist model. One possibility is simply to call such 
findings a paradox of posthypnotic amnesia “that the subject knows but 
does not know, remembers but does not remember” (Kihlstrom, 1978b, 
p. 12). This approach plays on the multiple meanings attached to knocts 
and remember, but it hardly explains why verbal report fails and other 
measures of memory show no deficit. Alternatively, one may simply de- 
fine a failure to report as equivalent to failure in memory--“in the first 
place, there is a frank failure of memory, as indexed by the subject’s 
inability to recall or even recognize events which occurred or items 
which were learned when he or she was hypnotized” (Kihlstrom, 1978b, 
p. 11). This view is inconsistent, however, with most models of memory, 
including those cited by dissociationists (Anderson & Bower, 1972). In 
these models, the retrieval process comprises a number of distinct stages 
(e.g., activation, search, matching), terminating in an overt performance 
(e.g., verbalization) in response to a task demand. The subject’s failure to 
verbalize could be due to a failure in any one of the retrieval processes or 
in the performance process. 
Another argument has been that there is no contradiction between a 
subject’s statement that he/she cannot recall or recognize material and 
the evidence provided by more subtle procedures that the material de- 
monstratively affects cognition (Kihlstrom, 1978a). Usually, the evidence 
cited in support of this position is the multitude of experimental data 
showing that nonhypnotized subjects who cannot recall material outright 
can access it when given cues (Tulving & Osler, 1968; Tulving & Pearl- 
stone, 1966), can access partial information about the material (Brown & 
McNeil], 1966), and, of course, may recognize it (Mandler, Pearlstone, & 
Koopmans, 1969). Thus, some argue, unrecalled material in normal and 
posthypnotic forgetting is not necessarily “functionally ablated,” and 
should be described as “forgotten” even if it interferes with new learning 
or reveals itself in other ways. 
The position that posthypnotic amnesia parallels normal forgetting is 
not strongly supported by empirical data, however. For example, one 
would expect to find that posthypnotic subjects’ forgetting should be 
“breached” when appropriate recall cues are given just as normal sub- 
jects’ forgetting can be breached (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). But a 
number of studies performed to demonstrate the power of posthypnotic 
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forgetting have shown than it cannot be breached in the normal way 
(Kihlstrom et al., 1980; Pettinati, Evans, Orne, & Orne, 1981). Subjects 
even deny recall and recognition after being shown tapes of themselves 
learning the material as a cue for recall (McConkey et al., 1980). Thus, 
the analogy with normal forgetting fails. The only escape from this di- 
lemma for the dissociationists is to define unawareness as the only neces- 
sary characteristic of dissociation. While Hilgard (1977) and Kihlstrom 
(1978b) seem to assert that unawareness is the only essential attribute of 
dissociation, the explanatory value of this reinterpretation of dissociation 
is questionable. 
Disrupted Search 
In the previous section we have argued that, within the context of cur- 
rent thinking on human information processing, the concept of dissocia- 
tion is outmoded as an explanation of observed cognitive deficits. This 
does not mean that the term cannot be used validly as a descriptor. How- 
ever, a number of other models have been proposed which provide more 
compelling process explanations of posthypnotic amnesia. 
According to the disrupted search model (Evans & Kihlstrom, 1973; 
Kihlstrom, 1975, 1977; Kihlstrom & Evans, 1976), the memory activa- 
tion process required to begin retrieval is deliberately disrupted or 
blocked by the subject’s executive program. Since this disruption re- 
quires effort, it will be imperfect and some forbidden material will be 
retrieved. The exact form that the disruption takes would have to depend 
upon the general model of memory one adopts. One possibility is that the 
appropriate retrieval cues or commands are not issued by the executive 
program. Another is that activation is interrupted by the executive when- 
ever it detects the search coming close to forbidden areas. In either case, 
it is the activation and search processes that are disrupted. 
According to the more influential theories of memory processing (An- 
derson, 1976; Anderson & Bower, 1972; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Gillund 
& Shiffrin, 1984; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 
1981), such activation and search may be less important in recognition 
(though search certainly plays a role in both) than in recall because the 
recognition probe activates memory structures by itself. Therefore, the 
disrupted search model predicts that hypnotic suggestions for forgetting 
should have less effect on recognition than on recall. Although experi- 
ments comparing posthypnotic recognition and recall (Barber & Cal- 
verley, 1966; Williamsen et al., 1965) have confirmed this prediction, rec- 
ognition is nevertheless substantially reduced by hypnotic suggestions for 
forgetting (Barber & Calverley, 1966; Kihlstrom & Shor, 1978; Wil- 
liamsen et al., 1965). Furthermore, while one would expect from the 
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disrupted search model that the ratio of loss in recall to loss in recognition 
should increase as the hypnotic susceptibility of the subjects increases 
and search is more disrupted, such is not the case (Kihlstrom & Shot-, 
1978; St. Jean & Coe, 1981). 
The other empirical evidence frequently cited in support of the 
disrupted search model is that the fragmentary material recalled fol- 
Lowing a hypnotic suggestion for forgetting seems disorganized. Disor- 
ganization has been reported in temporal order (Evans & Kihlstrom, 
1973; Kihlstrom & Evans, 1979) and in categorical organization (Radtke- 
Bodorik, Planas, & Spanos, 1980; Spanos & Bodorik, 1977; Spanos & 
D’Eon, 1980; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980). On the basis of 
such evidence, Kihlstrom and Evans (1979) concluded that posthypnotic 
amnesia stems from a “disorganization” of the process of memory 
search. Although St. Jean and Coe (1981) questioned the replicability of 
the temporal disorganization effect, Kihlstrom and Wilson (1984) repro- 
duced the effect. Yet the line of evidence leading from the structural dis- 
organization of retrieved material to the functional disorganization of 
memory processes is not clear. Organized processes can produce disor- 
ganized material and random processes may repoduce structured data 
(Knuth, 1969). 
Much of the disorganization data can be challenged on methodological 
grounds as well. Because very high recall is considered evidence of lack 
of susceptibility to hypnosis, and very low recall prevents the measure- 
ment of clustering, subjects with very high or very low recall are usually 
eliminated before organization is measured in the hypnosis condition 
(Kihlstrom & Evans, 1979; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980). It 
can be argued that this selection process assures a lower average clus- 
tering score for the hypnosis condition than for the control conditions. 
This follows from the fact that subjects with moderate recall usually have 
lower clustering scores than subjects with very low or very high recall 
scores. Subjects with very high recall usually have recalled well because 
they have organized the material effectively. Those with very low recall, 
on the other hand, frequently display high clustering scores simply by 
virtue of having so little material to organize. Although some investi- 
gators have attempted to surmount this methodological problem by 
matching subjects on recall (Evans & Kihlstrom, 1980), the results of 
those studies are open to numerous interpretations. Thus, the disorgani- 
zation that has been found in posthypnotic amnesia subjects might have 
been due, at least in part, to this selection artifact, and the results are 
therefore not especially informative concerning the disrupted search 
model. Finally, it is hard to reconcile the disrupted search model with the 
previously reported failure of subjects to substantially improve posthyp- 
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notic recall when the cues present during encoding are reintroduced 
during recall (McConkey et al., 1980). 
Distracted Attention 
Spanos and his colleagues (Spanos & D’Eon, 1980; Spanos, Radtke- 
Bodorik, & Stam, 1980; Spanos, Stam, D’Eon, Pawlak, & Radtke-Bo- 
dorik, 1980) have proposed a quite different model to explain these and 
other posthypnotic amnesia data. Originally, Spanos and Bodorik (1977) 
had hypothesized that the very low level of arousal present during hyp- 
nosis interferes with retrieval. Two problems immediately are apparent 
with this model. First, the retrieval deficit occurs posthypnotically after 
the period of obvious low arousal is over. Second, the evidence has accu- 
mulated steadily that the deficits in information processing produced by 
hypnosis require effort and arousal (Bowers & Brennenman, 1981; Coe, 
1978; Hilgard, 1977; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980). Empiri- 
cally, the amount of forgetting has not been greater for low-arousal hyp- 
notic subjects (Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980). These contra- 
dictions led Spanos to reject the arousal model in favor of a distracted 
attention model. 
To interpret such a model in information processing terms requires a 
definition of attention. Let us define attention as the concentration of 
mental effort indicated by the current contents of working memory and 
the currently active information processing routines. In their formulation 
of a distracted attention model, Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, and Stam 
(1980) assert that hypnotic subjects who have been given a suggestion for 
forgetting “attend to activities other than the recall of the target mate- 
rial” during the posthypnotic period. Their underlying assumption is that 
retrieval from memory requires a decision to retrieve coupled with a 
commitment of mental effort. This effort might consist of activating 
search in general or of directing memory search by sending cues to the 
memory system. If the subject directs his/her attention elsewhere, re- 
trieval will not occur. 
One problem with this model is that memory activation can clearly 
occur without the subject being aware of it or committing effort to it. 
While the effortful processes used in recall may not escape awareness, 
certain processes that enhance recall do operate automatically out of 
awareness (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). For ex- 
ample, dichotic shadowing studies have shown that memory is activated 
by meaningful words even if attention is directed away from the words 
(Lewis, 1970; Moray, 1969; Triesman, Squire, & Green, 1974; Von 
Wracht, Anderson, & Stenman, 1975). Such automatic memory activa- 
tion could account for the posthypnotic interference and enhancement 
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effects described above. But then why should posthypnotic recall not 
benefit from the same activation? 
A different type of distracted attention model can surmount these diffi- 
culties. Assume that material retrieved from long-term memory must 
enter attention (working memory) before it can be output. Entrance nor- 
mally could be automatic for sufficiently activated material. One way to 
deny admission of such material to working memory is to overload 
working memory with entries from sensory systems and other memories. 
The forbidden to-be-remembered material is activated but not admitted 
to attention because the subject has directed his/her attention elsewhere. 
In this “overloaded attention” model the working memory (primary 
memory, short-term memory) has a limited capacity and material outside 
that memory is outside attention (Norman, 1968; Waugh & Norman, 
1965). If one assumes that attention to material is a minimum requirement 
for awareness, the subject would not be aware that the forbidden material 
had been retrieved if its admission into working memory were blocked by 
the memory’s overloading. 
Several aspects of this “overloaded attention” model are particularly 
attractive. A fundamental component of all hypnotic induction proce- 
dures is focused attention (Hilgard, 1977). Only those subjects who can 
easily focus their attention are used in the standard hypnosis experiment 
as only they can pass the preexperimental screening for susceptibility. 
While a subject’s focused attention during hypnosis cannot be a direct 
cause of posthypnotic recall deficits, the fact that a subject is highly hyp- 
notically susceptible means that the subject has the ability to focus and 
perhaps overload his/her attention. 
According to this overloaded attention model, one would expect to find 
a positive relation between hypnotic susceptibility and degree of recall 
failure. Such is the case (Kihlstrom & Evans, 1976). In addition, partial 
recall would not be organized about categories since it represents time- 
dependent interruption in a continuous process. Since the hypnotic effect 
does not operate on the memory search component, recognition should 
be seriously affected as well. However, recognition should remain supe- 
rior since superior search cues are being provided. All of these predic- 
tions are consistent with the data reported above. 
The distracted attention models fit the data from studies of hypnotic 
analgesia as well as memory failure. For example, one could argue that 
the subjective experience of pain is lessened in hypnotic analgesia be- 
cause the subject’s attention is focused away from the sensory impulses 
entering the information processing system (Karlin, Morgan, & Gold- 
stein, 1980). 
Although the distracted attention model can adequately explain post- 
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hypnotic failures in recall and recognition, data from the studies showing 
that posthypnotically forgotten material inhibits recall of interfering ma- 
terial and enhances performance on new learning tasks (Graham & 
Patton, 1968; Hull, 1933; Messerschmidt, 1927) or influences behavior in 
other ways (Kilhstrom & Evans, 1978) are less easily handled. One must 
argue, as the neodissociationists do, that the stored material need not 
enter working memory in order to have these subtle effects but only 
needs to be activated in long-term memory. Such an explanation would 
suffice, but no data directly support it, and at least some data from inter- 
ference studies with normals suggest that interference effects are due to 
inappropriate cues being present in working memory during recall or re- 
learning (Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Psotka, 1971). An even more serious 
flaw in these distracted attention models concerns their selectivity. In 
order for some retrieved memories to enter attention while the forbidden 
information is denied requires a selective distracted attention model. 
Somehow the forbidden material must be detected before attention is di- 
rected at it so attention can be directed away from it. 
Output Inhibition 
An alternative to the distracted attention model of posthypnotic am- 
nesia is the verbal inhibition model proposed by Coe (1978) and others. 
These researchers argue that subjects actually recall the to-be-remem- 
bered material but simply inhibit their verbal report. Coe and his col- 
leagues have emphasized the role of the hypnotic context in causing 
“keeping of secrets.” As a result, the verbal inhibition model has been 
characterized as noncognitive (Kihlstrom, 1978a). Nevertheless, it has a 
very clear information-processing interpretation that is consistent with 
recent theorizing in cognitive psychology. The to-be-remembered mate- 
rial is activated and retrieved into working memory (attention). There it is 
processed by a routine that checks to see if it is forbidden material. If it is 
forbidden, it is denied output and perhaps admission into awareness. 
Such a model solves one thorny problem that none of the previous cogni- 
tive models could handle very well. How can forbidden material be de- 
nied retrieval selectively? It is a paradox comparable to the paradox of 
selective attention or input (Broadbent, 1973). To decide not to process 
information, one must obviously process the information to some extent. 
The only alternative is the kind of classical dissociation in which part of 
memory is excised. But, as demonstrated above, a mass of evidence 
argues against such functional ablation. The verbal inhibition model 
handles the paradox by assuming the forbidden information does not 
reach working memory where it is processed to see if output is allowed. 
Is the subject aware of such information? The evidence from postexperi- 
mental reports is that some subjects are aware of having retrieved the 
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forbidden material and simply do not output it, but many others are not 
aware of having retrieved it (Coe, 1978; Kihlstrom et al., 1980; Spanos, 
Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980). Furthermore, many of those who are 
aware of the material report that they could not say it no matter how hard 
they tried. 
Locus of the Posthypnotic Effect and Active Use of Forbidden Material 
When the above theories of posthypnotic amnesia are compared in an 
information-processing framework, it becomes apparent that they can be 
distinguished by how close they identify the locus of the amnesia effect to 
the final response called output. Classical dissociationists invoked a frac- 
tionation of memory and neodissociationists proposed that memory re- 
trieval routines were separated from executive control. In the disrupted 
search model the locus of the posthypnotic effect is somewhat less re- 
mote from the response. Search of memory is interrupted whenever for- 
bidden material might be activated. In the distracted attention models the 
locus of the effect is closer to response at the level of working memory. 
Working memory and attention are directed at extraneous stimulation or 
memories so that cues that might activate forbidden material are kept out 
of attention. In the output inhibition model, the locus of the amnesia is 
closest to the response. Forbidden memories are activated, retrieved, en- 
tered into working memory, and processed, but are denied output. 
These differences in the locus of the posthypnotic effect-at what 
point it causes the deficit in memory-have implications for the nature of 
the behavioral phenomena that result. One category of phenomena can 
be characterized as involving “passive” processes because they do not 
require activation of the forgotten material into working memory where it 
would then be used to produce verbal output. This category includes 
such phenomena as retroactive and proactive interference. These passive 
processes can be contrasted with “active” ones in which the forgotten 
material is used generatively. One example of such an active process is 
when a subject generates a to-be-remembered sentence in normal speech. 
Another, less obvious, example is when a subject generates a behavior 
which itself requires knowledge and processing of the to-be-remembered 
material. The premise underlying such active processing is that the mate- 
rial must enter working memory and attention (though not necessarily 
awareness). 
If the posthypnotic suggestion to forget has its effect in long-term 
memory, as in the dissociation models, then the forbidden material would 
not be activated at all and could only be revealed passively, as in interfer- 
ence effects. It seems appropriate to label this amnesia. The distracted 
attention model has the same implication: to the extent that attention is 
not always completely distracted, some of the forbidden material might 
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enter working memory and thus could be reported and actively em- 
ployed, but that which does not enter could legitimately be said to be 
unretrievable. Finally, the output inhibition model assumes that material 
is activated and retrieved into working memory, but, upon its detection 
as forbidden material, it is denied output and excluded from awareness. 
Since the material does enter working memory, it could actively influence 
behavior even though it is neither recalled nor recognized. 
Unfortunately, none of the existing empirical studies has examined the 
effect of hypnotic suggestions for forgetting on any active processes other 
than recall and recognition. The problem is to develop an experimental 
paradigm that can distinguish between active use, passive use, and recall. 
One would like a paradigm in which use of the forbidden material should 
be possible without the subject’s awareness, and in which the demand 
characteristics for poorer performance produced by the forgetting sug- 
gestions would be unlikely to suppress active use if the material were 
retrieved. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1 we have constructed such an experimental paradigm. 
First, subjects are asked to solve a number of problems which require a 
particular solution algorithm (the “set”). Once the algorithm is learned, 
most subjects should solve all problems with that algorithm even when 
much simpler solutions are available. This is the Einstelfung effect (Lu- 
chins, 1942). Then some subjects are given a hypnotic suggestion to 
forget all the problems and to forget the solution algorithm. The depen- 
dent measure is how these subjects perform posthypnotically on new 
problems. On the one hand, if a subject retrieves the old learned algo- 
rithm, the subject should display the Einstellung effect-that is, the sub- 
ject should actively use the old algorithm and not be able to solve the 
problems by new, simpler methods. If a new problem can only be solved 
by a simpler algorithm, the subject should have great difficulty with it. 
On the other hand, if the algorithm is still present in memory but it is not 
retrieved into attention and working memory, the subject should solve 
new problems by the simpler methods used by most control subjects. 
Then, after the releaser signal is given, the subject should use the old, 
long method again. This design has the advantage that retrieval failure 
reveals itself in improved performance and retrieval success reveals itself 
in decreased performance. Furthermore, recall of the problems can be 
tested independently of the measure of active use of the forbidden mate- 
rial. In this experiment, as in Luchins’ (1942) study, “water jar” 
problems are used as the experimental task. 
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Method 
The experiment required four groups of subjects: (1) a group that received the learning 
“set” and a hypnotic suggestion to forget it, (2) a similar group that differed only in being 
released from the forgetting suggestion before testing, (3) a control group that received the 
learning “set” but no suggestions for forgetting, and (4) a control group that did not receive 
the learning “set” but worked on anagrams during the learning period. The design is dia- 
grammed in Table 1. 
Subjects. The subjects for the experiment were 49 introductory psychology students who 
scored 6 or higher on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Ome, 
1962). They represented approximately the upper 257~ of the sample that were pretested for 
susceptibility. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups. 
yielding 13 in each of three groups and IO in the untreated control group. 
Muterials. The problems used were “water jar” problems taken from Luchins’ (1942) 
investigation of the Einstellung effect. They are listed in Table 2. The first two sample 
problems are solvable with a few simple operations. The next four problems are only solv- 
able by one particular “long” method, i.e.. “fill the largest jar (the second jar). Pour from it 
into the third jar twice and then pour from it into the first jar. The remainder in the second 
jar will be the desired amount.” These four problems are designed to establish a “set” for 
solving the problems. The fifth problem is a test to check if the set has been formed. It could 
be solved either by the same “long” method or by a simpler “short” method. Of the four 
test problems that follow, the first two and the last can be solved by either the long or a 
short method; the third cannot be solved by the long method. 
Procedure. Subjects were run in groups of four to six in a small, quiet room. The proce- 
dure for each group is diagrammed in Table I. After a brief introduction. each subject was 
given two sample water jar problems to solve. The subject was shown how to solve them if 
he/she experienced difficulty. Then the procedure diverged for each group. The two control 
groups relaxed and listened to music for 27 min. The two hypnotic groups listened for the 
same amount of time to a tape-recorded induction procedure adapted from Barber (1969). 
This procedure began with suggestions for focused attention and proceeded to suggestion3 
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TABLE 2 
The “Water Jar (WJ)” Problems 
Problem 
Given jars Measure 
Function of size out Solution 
Sample 
1 29 3 20 29-3-3-3 
2 9 2 7 9-2 
Form “set” 
1 14 163 25 99 163 - 25 - 25 - 14 
2 18 43 10 5 43 - 10 - 10 - 18 
3 9 42 6 21 42-6-6-9 
4 20 59 4 31 59-4-4-20 
Manipulation check 
1 23 49 3 20 49-3-3-23 
23 - 3 
Test 
1 15 39 3 18 39-3-3-15 
15 + 3 
2 18 48 4 22 48-4-4-18 
18 + 4 
3 28 76 3 25 No long solution 28 - 3 
4 14 36 8 6 36-8-8-14 
14 - 8 
for sleep and various motor actions, e.g., arm levitation, muteness, and immobility. All 
hypnotic subjects showed these behaviors. At the end of the 27 min, the subjects in the 
hypnotic groups and water jar control groups received the water jar problems and solved 
them over 13 min. These problems were intended to create a “set” to solve the problems by 
the “long” method. The instructions were tape-recorded, and the solution to each problem 
was explained before the next problem was presented. During this time the anagram control 
group solved anagrams for 13 min. Next, the hypnotic groups were given the posthypnotic 
amnesia suggestion and were brought out of hypnosis while the two control groups rested. 
The amnesia suggestion was, 
I want you to forget the problems you just worked on. You will not remember 
working on these problems. You will forget how you solved them. I want you to 
forget everything about the problems. You will be completely unable to recall any- 
thing that happened while your eyes were open just now. You won’t know why, 
and it won’t bother you. But you will not be able to remember anything about the 
problems and their solution. Everything will be gone, completely gone from your 
memory. You will be unable to think of, recall, or remember the problems in any 
way. When the experimenter claps his hands three times, like this (clap, clap. 
clap) you will be able to remember the problems. 
During this time the two nonhypnotic groups simply rested. 
At the beginning of the test session, the hypnotic release group heard three claps to 
release their amnesia. All groups were given the four water jar test problems via a 12-min 
tape recording. Three minutes were allowed for each problem and solutions were not pre- 
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sented. For the two hypnotic groups the test period was followed by a recall task in which 
the subjects were asked to write down any problem or rules for solving a problem that they 
remembered from the learning period. Credit was given for every problem or rule mentioned 
that could be recognized as having been used in the learning period. Finally, the unreleased 
hypnotic group was released from the amnesia. All subjects were debriefed. 
Results 
All but one of the subjects receiving the water jar training sequence 
solved the manipulation-check problem by the long method, which indi- 
cates that the set solution was successfully established.’ 
It is also important to demonstrate that the amnesia suggestion in fact 
decreased subjects’ verbal recall of what happened during the hypnosis 
session. This was tested by asking subjects to write down any problem or 
rules for solving a problem that they remembered from the learning pe- 
riod. For the conditions in which recall was tested, recall credit was given 
if either the complete problem statement was reported or a partial 
problem statement coupled with the solution method was reported. Thus, 
both recall of the long solution method and specific problem character- 
istics contributed to recall scores. A subject’s score could range from 0 to 
5 problems recalled. 
As Table 3 shows, the mean recall score for the amnesia group was 0.46 
compared with 2.31 for the amnesia release group. This highly significant 
difference indicates that the amnesia sugggestion decreased hypnotically 
susceptible subjects’ recall, as expected. 
The problem-solving data for all groups are also presented in Table 3. 
First, let us examine the unhypnotized “water jar” control group and 
compare it with the unhypnotized “anagram” control group. These re- 
sults are typical of the Einstellung effect. Every subject in the anagram 
control group solved every water jar test problem by the short method. 
On the other hand, every subject in the water jar control group, which 
had learned the long method originally, solved each of the first two test 
problems by the long method. Only when the third problem, unsolvable 
by the long method, was presented did these subjects use the short 
method. But even then, almost half these subjects could not solve this 
problem at all, so strong was this fixation on the long solution method. 
For the final problem, solvable by either method, about half the water jar 
control subjects used each method. 
Now let us compare these results with those of the hypnotized groups. 
The hypnotic amnesia group was instructed to forget everything about 
the water jar problems and their solution. When asked to recall the 
’ The one subject who used a short solution was in the amnesia group. He was retained in 
the experiment since his having learned the set less well should only have made it easier for 
him to “forget” the set. 
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TABLE 3 
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(t(24) = 4.97, p < ,001) 
yn = 13. 
bn = 10. 
problems, in fact, they reported very little-on the average only one-half 
problem per subject. Yet their performance on the problems is almost 
indistinguishable from the water jar control group and quite significantly 
different from the anagram control group. Every subject but one solved 
both of the first two test problems by the long method they had been 
instructed to forget, This indicates “active” retrieval of the method. 
Subjects who did not retrieve the method would solve the problems like 
the anagram control group did. Similarly, over half of the hypnotic am- 
nesia subjects failed to solve the third problem (for which no long solu- 
tion exists), when these subjects should have had no more difficulty than 
anagram subjects if they had not retrieved the long method. The only 
difference -and a nonsignificant one-between the hypnotic amnesia 
group and the water jar control group occurred on the fourth test problem 
on which more of the amnesia group used the long solution. 
The amnesia release group performed indistinguishably from the water 
jar control group and the amnesia group except on the verbal recall task. 
Their performance on the test problems was no different, indicating they 
retrieved the solution method no better than the unreleased group. How- 
ever, their self-reported recall of problems (A4 = 2.31) was about five 
times higher (t(24) = 4.97, p < .OOl) than the unreleased group’s recall 
(M = 0.46). 
Discussion 
These results are difficult to reconcile with any disrupted memory acti- 
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vation or dissociation model. The forbidden material-the water jar so- 
lution algorithm- clearly entered the working memory of virtually every 
hypnotized subject. If it had not been actively retrieved, it could not have 
been employed to solve the first two test problems. Instead, the short 
method would have been used, just as in the anagram control group. Fur- 
thermore, if it had not been retrieved into working memory, the subject 
would have searched more readily for other ways to solve the third test 
problem and a greater proportion should have succeeded than in the re- 
leased amnesia group or the water jar control group. It is difficult to argue 
that active retrieval of the solution algorithm is not needed to solve the 
problems, as with interference effects. If it were not actively retrieved, 
the algorithm could hardly be employed. 
When one considers the recall data in conjunction with the problem 
solution data, the distracted attention model also does not hold up well. If 
attention were sufficiently distracted to prevent recall of the problem. 
why was it not sufficiently distracted to prevent the retrieval and use of 
the solution algorithm? 
The output inhibition model fits the observed data more accurately. 
According to this model, both the solution algorithm and problems 
should be retrieved, with some loss, into working memory (attention). 
The subject blocks the output of the problems because he/she recognizes 
them as forbidden material. However, the use of the solution algorithm to 
solve new problems does not require an explicit verbal report of the algo- 
rithm. It only requires that the algorithm be retrieved into working 
memory. Therefore, as was observed, the retrieved material is denied 
verbal output but is actively employed in problem solving. 
One other alternative explanation must be at least briefly considered. It 
is possible that in the standard posthypnotic recall or recognition para- 
digms, subjects simply lie about retrieveal. In other words, they con- 
sciously and deliberately suppress verbalization of the retrieval informa- 
tion in order to fulfill the role expected of a hypnotic subject. Such a 
model would explain the data from the water jar experiment. Of course, 
the possibility that hypnotic subjects are faking their responses has been 
raised to explain hypnotic phenomena ever since they were first ob- 
served. Over the past 20 years, investigators have developed theories and 
conducted research designed to determine whether hypnotic subjects’ 
performance is “real” (i.e., attributable to some psychological process 
unique to hypnosis) or artifactual. 
Orne (1959) compared the responses to suggestions of hypnotized sub- 
jects and nonhypnotically susceptible control subjects who were induced 
to simulate being hypnotized (i.e., to fake their responses to suggestions). 
If the hypnotized subjects had been faking, they should have been indis- 
tinguishable from the simulators, but they were not. Orne explained the 
differences (which occurred in response to some, but not to all, sugges- 
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tions) by describing the hypnotized subjects as experiencing “trance 
logic.” Sarbin and Coe (1972; Coe, 1978) developed a model of the hyp- 
notic role and Barber (1969; Barber & Calverly, 1962) developed a task 
motivation model. Neither of these models asserts that hypnotized sub- 
jects are faking; nor do they assert that the behavior is attributable to the 
hypnotic trance. Rather, each explains hypnotic behavior as determined 
by social psychological variables that also explain other categories of be- 
havior. 
There is much empirical evidence that supports each of the above 
models, but each has been the target of trenchant criticism, as well. The 
current state of knowledge, therefore, does not allow us to rule out con- 
clusively that hypnotic behavior can be explained by subjects’ faking, but 
the weight of the evidence points to other more complex mechanisms and 
leads us to judge faking an implausible one. 
Although Experiment 1 seems to provide compelling evidence that 
posthypnotic deficits in recall and recognition are not memory retrieval 
failures but rather output failures, it remains to be explained exactly how 
verbal output of forbidden material is suppressed. Somehow the to-be- 
forgotten items must be marked as “forbidden” after the amnesia sug- 
gestion is given, and this “forbidden tag” must be processed in working 
memory when retrieval is requested and attempted. 
One mechanism by which this may occur is that a forbidden tag can be 
explicitly associated with every to-be-forgotten item. This mechanism 
seems implausible, however, because it is unduly cumbersome and would 
require substantial processing time following the amnesia suggestion. The 
same result can be achieved more efficiently by an alternative mecha- 
nism. The subject marks larger semantic structures in episodic memory 
as forbidden, denoting that all the items or substructures within those 
structures are “to-be-forgotten.” However, within this mechanism at 
least two different models for utilizing the tags at retrieval time are plau- 
sible. 
In one model, any tags encountered during the memory search process 
are attached to all subsequently retrieved substructures further along the 
same branch in episodic memory. When retrieving the item into working 
memory, the tag is detected and output is inhibited. In the other model, 
tags are not attached to substructures during search. Instead, when an 
item is retrieved into working memory, its representations in episodic 
memory are “reactivated.” This reactivation spreads in the memory net- 
work and, if a forbidden tag is reactivated in the process, then output of 
the item is suppressed. 
The available data do not distinguish well between these models. Kihl- 
Strom’s (1980) experiments are most relevant. He found that subjects 
who did not recall to-be-forgotten words nevertheless gave them as re- 
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sponses in free-association and category-instance tests. These results 
make the “reactivation” model less plausible because, according to this 
model, the forbidden tag would be reactivated when a response is to be 
made, even in a free-association context. That is, according to the reacti- 
vation model, the forbidden tag should be reactivated regardless of how 
the to-be-forgotten word is accessed; according to the tag model, on the 
other hand, the tag should be reactivated only when the to-be-forgotten 
word is accessed via a search through the branches of episodic memory. 
It should also be noted that there may in fact have been an amnesia 
effect that was not detected in Kihlstrom’s study. Some to-be-forgotten 
words may indeed have been suppressed as responses in the free-associa- 
tion and category-instance tests, but this suppression would have been 
detected only if performances had been compared before and after the 
amnesia release signal, a test that was not reported. In other words, 
emission of to-be-forgotten words in response to a priming cue might 
have been even greater if the amnesia suggestion had not been given. If 
such an amnesia effect did indeed occur, the reactivation model would 
remain viable. 
Furthermore, in Kihlstrom’s (1980) study the to-be-forgotten words 
were not presented originally in any controlled semantic context, so the 
semantic structure in episodic memory elicited during the free-associa- 
tion test could have differed from the one in which the tag was encoded. 
If this were the case, it could help to explain why subjects were unable to 
recall the to-be-forgotten words but were able to report them on the free- 
association test. One implication, of course, is that the semantic contexts 
for learning and memory tests should be controlled. Another implication 
concerns the nature of evidence that would disconfirm the reactivation 
model. 
Suppose hypnotized subjects hear a set of semantically ambiguous 
words in a story guaranteed to bias in favor of one particular meaning. 
The subjects are then told to forget the story and everything about it. 
Later the semantically ambiguous words are presented and the subjects 
are asked to give an association to each. If the tag model is correct, sub- 
jects should be able to give associations that reflect the meaning of words 
in the context of the story. This would indicate that the story had been 
reactivated even though it was not recalled. On the other hand, if the 
reactivation model is correct, subjects should not be able to give associa- 
tions that reflect the meaning of the words in the story. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
This experiment tested whether subjects who were instructed to forget 
a particular semantic structure posthypnotically would suppress verbal 
reports that activated, and were activated by, the semantic structure. In 
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particular, each subject was asked to listen to a story containing several 
homographs whose meanings were biased by the story. After being given 
a suggestion for posthypnotic amnesia for the story, the subject was then 
asked to generate close associates of the homographs. The words re- 
ported were scored to see if they indicated activation of the forbidden 
semantic context. 
Method 
Subjects. As before, the subjects were introductory psychology students who scored 6 or 
higher on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1962). The 50 
subjects were randomly assigned to five groups-three amnesia groups and two amnesia 
release groups. 
Materials. Two stories of approximately 300 words each were written. Each contained 
the same 10 high-frequency homographs. One story concerned a visit to a baseball game, 
and the other concerned the exploration of a cave. The homographs were clearly biased 
toward one specific meaning by the stories. For example, “diamond” and “bat” were two 
of the homographs. A third story, (the “neutral” story), written as a control, did not contain 
any of the homographs. 
Procedure. The subjects were again run in groups of four to six in a small quiet room. 
After a brief introduction, all subjects were hypnotized by the same 27-min procedure used 
in Experiment 1. Once hypnotized, the subjects were told to listen carefully to a tape-re- 
corded story. The story lasted about 2 min. The “cave” and “baseball” stories were heard 
by both the amnesia group and an amnesia release control group. The neutral story was 
heard only by an amnesia group, yielding a total of five different groups of 10 subjects each. 
Next, every group received the instruction for posthypnotic forgetting. These were very 
similar to those used in Experiment 1 and included the direction to “forget the story you 
have heard and everything about it.” These taped instructions required about 1 min and 
were followed by a 2-min passage to terminate hypnosis. 
After a 3-min rest, during which response booklets were distributed, subjects performed 
the word-association task. Their instructions were to generate three close associates of each 
word they would hear on the tape. The 10 homographs were then presented at 30-s in- 
tervals. Immediately before the tape was turned on, however, the experimenter gave the 
releaser signal for the “cave” and “baseball” amnesia release groups. After the response 
booklets were collected, the releaser signal was given for the remaining subjects, and all 
subjects were debriefed. 
Results 
Each word generated by a subject was classified as derived from the 
“baseball” meaning of the stimulus homograph, from the “cave” 
meaning, or from neither. The scoring was done by a rater blind to the 
subjects’ experimental condition, who examined all of a subject’s re- 
sponses simultaneously. If the rater was uncertain about a response, it 
was placed in a “neither” category. 
The mean percentages of associations falling in the “baseball” and 
“cave” categories for each group are shown in Table 4. The percentage 
of “cave” and “baseball” associations varied signiticantly as predicted, 
depending on the priming story used. However, whether or not the sub- 
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Note. Within each meaning, means having no common superscript are significantly dif- 
ferent at less than the .Ol level. n = 10 for each group. 
ject was released from amnesia before giving his/her associations had no 
effect on the percentage of associations of each type. In fact, the per- 
centages were almost identical for the released and unreleased condi- 
tions. 
Discussion 
Under instructions for posthypnotic forgetting of a semantic structure, 
subjects reported words whose meanings were associated with the for- 
bidden structure as adequately as when the instructions were lifted. The 
words reported were demonstrably activated by the forbidden structure 
and must also have activated it. Yet the subjects experienced no difficulty 
in reporting them. 
Such an outcome suggests that the verbal inhibition of forbidden mate- 
rial is accomplished by a mechanism similar to “tagging” rather than a 
check for activation of a forbidden structure. Upon receipt of the instruc- 
tions for posthypnotic forgetting, the subject may tag what he/she per- 
ceived to be forbidden. The tag need not be applied individually to all 
items in a set but could be attached to an attribute defining a set in epi- 
sodic memory. Upon activation and retrieval of material into working 
memory, but before output, a check must then be made to see if a “for- 
bidden” tag is attached to the material. When the releaser signal is given, 
the tag may remain, but the check need no longer be made. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The model for the effects of posthypnotic amnesia on memory that has 
emerged from these experiments operates at the level of working memory 
and attention. Our analysis of previous research coupled with the results 
of the two experiments suggests that retrieval from long-term memory is 
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not directly affected by hypnotic instructions to forget. Deficits in long- 
term memory search may be produced indirectly by the subject’s failure 
to input the appropriate retrieval cues. Even when appropriate cues are 
forced upon the subject (McConkey & Sheehan, 1981), however, the def- 
icits in verbal report remain; so the lack of cues is not a sufficient expla- 
nation. More importantly, as Experiment 1 demonstrated, hypnotically 
forbidden material that is not reported as recalled can be retrieved into 
working memory and actively utilized. The deficit occurs only in explicit 
output of the material. Experiment 2 suggested that this inhibition of 
output derived from a tag applied specifically to the semantic structure 
representing the forbidden material and did not extend to acoustically or 
semantically similar material even if it reactivated the to-be-forgotten ma- 
terial. We propose that when a highly hypnotically susceptible subject is 
given a posthypnotic suggestion to forget certain material, the subject 
attempts to associate “forbidden” tags with the material in memory. 
Such tags may be associated with individual items in episodic memory or 
with sets of items connected in lists or semantic structures. However, 
tagging will be imperfect both because of imperfect interpretation of the 
hypnotists’ instructions and difficulties in inserting the tags. When 
memory access is attempted during the posthypnotic period, activation of 
memory, search, and retrieval into working memory proceeds unham- 
pered. Therefore, the forbidden material may be employed actively by 
the information-processing system, may influence new learning, and may 
reveal itself indirectly through its effects on behavior. However, for- 
bidden material cannot be explicitly reported, because it is tagged as for- 
bidden and the output routines check for such tags. Unless the tag was 
not inserted or is not detected or obeyed at output time, the forbidden 
material will not be reported. 
The Output Inhibition Model 
An essential element of this theory is that the “to-be-forgotten” mate- 
rial must be retrieved and tagged as forbidden in order to be “forgotten,” 
i.e., not reported as recalled. Therefore, posthypnotic amnesia requires 
active processing after the forgetting instruction is given and again when 
recall or recognition is attempted. The tag indicating forbidden may be 
attached to an individual item or an entire semantic structure in episodic 
memory. However, for amnesia to occur, the forbidden tag must be en- 
countered at retrieval time and carried into working memory with the 
item. Being “connected” by some path to a forbidden tag is not by itself 
a sufficient condition for an item to have its output inhibited, however. 
Consider the case of an experiment in which subjects learn a list to a 
criterion that is less than perfect recall and then are instructed to forget it 
with a hypnotic suggestion. For an individual item to be “forgotten,” 
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several things must happen. First, a subject must interpret the forgetting 
suggestion as requiring forgetting of the item in question. Second, the 
subject must access that item’s representation in memory and tag it as 
“forbidden.” Third, the tag must be retained until retrieval time. Finally, 
the tag must be encountered at retrieval time, carried into working 
memory with the item, and obeyed. 
We propose that the hypnotized subject responds to instructions to 
forget a list by attempting to retrieve the list in order to tag it as for- 
bidden. Some words (the better connected ones, the ones more closely 
related to active cues, the more meaningful words, those at the beginning 
or end of the list) will be retrieved, but some will not. Words that are not 
accessed or are not part of an accessed structure will not be tagged to-be- 
forgotten. 
What happens later when the subject, still under the influence of the 
forgetting suggestion, is asked to recall the list? Again, semantic, tem- 
poral, and other cues activate the memory structures representing the list 
of words. Under our output inhibition model, forbidden tags encountered 
during memory search do not block the search but are attached to the 
words retrieved by the process. The retrieved words are transferred to 
working memory where they are checked for a forbidden tag. If a word 
has such a tag, its output is inhibited. Of course, other words that are 
difficult to recall may be neither retrieved nor output (as would be true 
with unhypnotized subjects). 
A difficult issue to address with this theory is whether the subjects are 
“aware” of their output inhibition. Usually, a person’s working memory 
is assumed to be the focus of his/her attention. Yet it is well established 
that certain automatic processes can operate on material passing through 
working memory without the subject’s awareness (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). The empirical evidence with regard to 
posthypnotic amnesia and awareness is confused. For some material 
some subjects report they recall the material but could not report it. For 
other material the subjects may deny any knowledge of the material. 
Other subjects may deny knowledge of all material (Coe, 1978; Kihlstrom 
et al., 1980; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980). One possibility 
suggested by the current model is that the items which a subject is aware 
of inhibiting are those that were not output because of forbidden tags, 
while the items which the subject is unaware of inhibiting are those that 
were not retrieved and tagged. Another possibility is that the forgetting 
instructions and therefore the forbidden tag are interpreted differently by 
different subjects. To some, detecting the tag may signal the necessity of 
inhibiting both output of the item and output of knowledge of the item 
(awareness). To others the tag may only signal inhibiting output of the 
item. 
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There are several interesting predictions of the output inhibition model 
that were not tested in these experiments. One of these stems from the 
fact that under the model an item must be retrieved at tagging time in 
order to be “forgotten” at recall time as a result of the amnesia sugges- 
tion. It follows, for example, that the list items for which the probability 
of recall should change the most between the amnesia and release condi- 
tions should be the items normally easiest to recall. Their not being re- 
called under amnesia must be due to inhibition of output which requires 
prior recall. On the other hand, the items that would be most likely to be 
recognized but not recalled in the amnesia condition should be the items 
normally hardest to recall since their not being recalled must be a true 
retrieval failure. This principle should hold regardless of whether “easy” 
and “hard” are defined in terms of serial position, meaningfulness, or 
any other known characteristic that affects encoding ease. 
We are unaware of published evidence on item difficulty and retrieval 
failure in posthypnotic amnesia. However, the recall and recognition data 
are consistent with the above model in that recognition deficits are not 
nearly as severe as recall deficits and recognition deficits remain about 
the same relative to recall deficits across susceptibility conditions. 
More clearly consistent with existing data are the predictions of the 
model about subjective and objective organization in recalled material. 
Again, because an item must be retrieved in order to be marked for- 
bidden, the items that are output under an amnesia suggestion should 
have less organization than normal output. The well-organized clusters of 
items will have been recalled and tagged as forbidden. Tagging failure is 
most likely to occur for items that are not well integrated with the other 
items on the list. Of course, many of these will also not be retrieved at 
recall time. However, among the items that are retrieved, one should 
expect less organization than among items retrieved by comparable con- 
trol groups, As discussed in the introduction, the evidence on organiza- 
tion of recalled material under amnesia instructions is not clear cut. Nev- 
ertheless, on the whole, the data suggest decreased organization among 
the material recalled under amnesia instructions. Such a finding is consis- 
tent with the proposed output inhibition model. 
Alternative Models 
Although the outcome of Experiment 1 could not have been explained 
in the context of a “distracted attention” model, “distracted attention” 
cannot be ruled out as playing a role in hypnotic memory phenomena and 
other hypnotic phenomena. In many respects the “output inhibition” 
model and “distracted attention” model are consonant. Under both, the 
locus of the hypnotically induced deficit is at the level of working 
memory and attention. Long-term memory activation, search, and re- 
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trieval processes are only influenced indirectly through what is input to 
the processes and through what happens to the output from the pro- 
cesses. It is possible that distracted attention could be a first defense 
whose failure necessitates output inhibition. However, there are several 
unresolved problems with the concept of selective distracted attention. 
For example, until the material enters attention, how can the informa- 
tion-processing system determine whether or not attention should be dis- 
tracted? Similarly, cues to forbidden material must be recognized as such 
before attention can be distracted from this material selectively. Never- 
theless, the ability of hypnotically susceptible subjects to focus their at- 
tention away from certain stimuli on demand (e.g., pain) is well docu- 
mented (Hilgard, Morgan, & Macdonald, 1975; Karlin et al., 1980). It 
may be that distracted attention provides a generalized lowering of 
memory processing while output inhibition provides the selectivity. 
Perhaps the most plausible alternatives to the output inhibition model 
are those models that postulate separate retrieval systems for episodic 
memory and for semantic or procedural memory. The experiments re- 
ported in this article reveal that hypnotic suggestions for amnesia elimi- 
nate verbal reports of episodes of learning but do not eliminate activation 
and utilization of the procedural and semantic information learned. Re- 
cent studies of patients displaying amnesia due to physiological factors 
(e.g., Korsakoff’s syndrome patients) have revealed some remarkably 
analogous results. 
Korsakoff’s syndrome patients display much poorer recall and recog- 
nition than normals on almost any standard verbal learning task. How- 
ever, it has been shown that they can learn and retain skills such as “in- 
verted mirror reading’ (Cohen & Squire, 1980) and solution algorithms 
for problems such as the Tower of Hanoi problem (Cohen & Corkin, 
1981). Furthermore, they retain such algorithms even though they report 
no memory of having solved such problems. Korsakoff’s syndrome sub- 
jects also perform as well as controls on word completion tasks that only 
require access to semantic memory, but they show a marked deficit on 
cued recall tasks requiring access to episodic information (Graf, Squire, 
& Mandler, 1984). The conclusion that most researchers have drawn 
from these studies is that episodic memory employs encoding and/or re- 
trieval systems that are distinct from those used in semantic or proce- 
dural memory. 
The possible implication is clear. Amnesia instructions delivered to 
susceptible subjects under hypnosis, like the neurological deficit in Kor- 
sakoff’s psychosis, might block retrieval in episodic memory but not in 
semantic or procedural memory. Such a model could explain most of the 
results of the current experiments and deserves further consideration. 
However, the model is not without its problems. First, the subjects in the 
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current study were asked to report any procedure for solving the 
problems that they could recall, and they could recall none. Thus, one 
needs an explanation of why information in procedural memory can be 
utilized but not reported. Second, any deficit in memory during posthyp- 
notic amnesia must have its locus in the retrieval process. However, 
there is evidence from the studies with Korsakoff’s syndrome patients 
(Graf et al., 1984) that their memory deficits are largest when the task 
requires elaboration rehearsal, i.e., an encoding process. Thus, the 
analogy may not hold. Finally, while all episodes are unretrievable to the 
Korsakoff’s patient, only those that the hypnotist instructs the subject to 
forget are unretrievable to the hypnotized subject. A mechanism is still 
needed to explain such selective retrieval, and the output inhibition 
model provides an explanation. 
SUMMARY 
The results of the two experiments reported in this paper in conjunc- 
tion with the analysis of other research on posthypnotic amnesia imply 
that hypnotic suggestions do not produce retrieval deficits but only in- 
hibit output. According to this theory, hypnotically supressed material is 
tagged as forbidden either directly or through its associated context. 
Upon activation it is retrieved into attention and short-term memory 
(though not necessarily awareness). At this point, however, the informa- 
tion-processing system blocks the verbal report (and perhaps awareness) 
of the forbidden information. As a result the forbidden information can be 
actively employed and may interfere with other processes but cannot be 
reported. While for many applications the practical consequences of the 
difference between retrieval without verbal report and no retrieval may 
be small, from a theoretical perspective they are important. Under the 
proposed theory hypnotism is exerting its effect only at a relatively pe- 
ripheral processing level and requires processing effort. Thus, subjects 
who are most responsive to suggestions and most in control of their in- 
formation processing display the greatest deficits in report. While the 
discussion in this article did not deal with hypermnesia or hypnotic age 
regression, the theory for posthypnotic amnesia that emerged suggests 
that one should look at the peripheral effects of hypnosis for either rees- 
tablishing an encoding context or eliminating verbal inhibitions. 
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